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This paper analyzes the mechanisms underlying excessive sexual risk taking in the 
presence of HIV. Drawing ideas from psychology on decision-making processes and 
risk evaluation, a theoretical model interacting affect-induced myopia and cognitive 
dissonance is developed and analyzed. The results of the theoretical analysis suggest 
that the effect of rationalization of personal risk depends on the risk of being HIV 
positive.  Although  rationalization  causes  excessive  risk  taking  behavior  for 
individuals  with  a  relatively  low  lifetime  risk,  it  may  prevent  fatalism  among 
individuals whose lifetime risk of HIV is perceived as overwhelming.  
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The purpose of this paper relates to the question of why people tend to engage in sexual 
behavior that is later regretted, and to how this tendency affects perceptions of personal risk and 
incentives to abstain from sexual risk taking in the future. More specifically, an inter-temporal 
model is developed in order to analyze the consequences of myopia and remorse on sexual 
behavior in the presence of HIV/AIDS. The model merges ideas from psychology regarding 
cognitive limitations of the human mind with economic theory of utility maximization, and is 
loosely based on previous work by Akerlof & Dickens (1982), O‟Donoghue & Rabin (2000), 
Loewenstein  &  O‟Donoghue  (2007),  Bénabou  a&  Tirole  (2002;  2004).  The  results  of  the 
theoretical analysis suggest that defensive denial of personal risk contribute to excessive risk 
taking behavior for individuals with a relatively low lifetime risk, but may prevent fatalism among 
individuals whose lifetime risk of HIV is perceived as overwhelming. In addition, and consistent 
with research in psychology,
2 the theoretical analysis further suggests that focusing attention on 
anticipated regret may prove beneficial for increasing intentions to adopt safer sex practices.  
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) has harvested human deaths for nearly three 
decades.
3 Although educational campaigns have resulted in increased levels of HIV awareness  
and some signs of safer sexual practices , unprotected casual sex is still practiced in HIV 
susceptible groups.
4 Admittedly, the persistence of sexual risk taking may in part be explained by 
the increased availability and efficiency of  antiretroviral (ARV)  therapy  or by risk loving 
preferences. However, for a large share of the HIV susceptible population, AIDS  is still 
associated with premature death as well as social stigmatization.
5 Similarly, risk loving preferences 
cannot alone explain sexual risk taking behavior. Research in psychology show that engagement 
in risky sex is often associated with  posterior regret, thus suggesting a presence of time -
inconsistent preferences.
 6 
Quasi-hyperbolic time preferences are today relatively standard procedure in economic models 
for intertemporal choice.
7 However, the mechanisms underlying the excess weight on present 
utility has not, until recently, received much attention. 
                                                           
2 See van der Pligt (1996) for an excellent review. 
3 UNAIDS (2009) 
4 Indeed, studies in sociology suggest that individuals with adequate HIV knowledge engage in recurrent sexual risk taking. See 
e.g. Campbell, (1997); Varga (1997b); Pettifor et al. (2000); MacPhail & Campbell (2001); Anderson & Beutel (2007) 
5 In 2008 alone, 2 million individuals died of AIDS related diseases. See Lakdawalla et al. (2006); Rao et al. (2006); Mechoulan 
(2007); UNAIDS (2009) 
6 See e.g. Richard, et al. (1996); Nordgren et al., (2007) 
7 See e.g. Strotz (1955-1956); Thaler & Shefrin (1981); Loewenstein & Prelec (1992); Laibson (1997); O‟Donoghue & Rabin (1999; 




Loewenstein  (1996)  offers  a  potential  explanation  to  time-inconsistent  preferences  by 
incorporating insights from neuroscience on how our decision-making capacity is affected during 
states  of  heightened  physical  arousal.  According  to  Loewenstein,  human  decision  making  is 
governed by two basic systems in the brain; a cognitive (rational), and an emotional (impulsive). 
Both systems are of importance for making adequate and efficient decisions in a given situation. 
The  cognitive  system  enables  probability  calculations  related  to  the  potential  outcomes  of  a 
decision, while emotions give the individual a quick reference concerning how he/she “feels” 
about the alternatives. However, visceral factors, such as hunger or sexual desire, tend to crowd out 
the cognitive system and may therefore hamper the ability to make decisions consistent with long 
term rationality. In line with this theory, Loewenstein et al., (2001), present empirical evidence 
indicating that both the mood experienced at the time of the decision and the time interval 
between decision and outcome has important implications for risk perception. More specifically, 
happy moods and a long time interval between tend to make people to react with a relatively low 
degree  of  fear  to  certain  types  of  objectively  dangerous  situations.
8  In accordance with this 
theory, Alhakami & Slovic (1994) find an inverse relationship between perceived risk and 
perceived benefit of an activity, and that the strength of the correlation is related to the intensity 
of positive or negative affect associated with that activity; if an individual likes an activity, the risk 
associated with that activity is judged as relatively lower and benefits as relatively higher than 
activities disliked. Similarly, Ariely and Loewenstein (2006), show that experimentally induced 
sexual  arousal  creates  an  acceptance  of  norm-violating  and  risky  behaviors  that  increase  the 
likelihood of having sex.
9 The ideas developed by Loewenstein concerning affect-induced myopia 
have been incorporated in economic models by , for example, O‟Donoghue & Rabin (2000), 
Loewenstein et al. (2003) and Lowenstein & O‟Donoghue (2007).
10  
Now, the presence of visceral cues may explain why time -inconsistent behavior ari ses. 
However, we are still left with the question of what consequences these inconsistencies hav e for 
future preferences and behavior. According to Ainslie (1974; 1975; 2001), the failure to exert self-
control may have long lasting effects on both behavior and preferences.  Ainslie argues that an 
individual can be depicted as a patchwork of interests that differ with regard to the time-horizon 
of need-fulfillment. The relative bargaining power of each interest depends on the proximity of 
need-fulfillment, how costs and benefits are bundled,  and on contextual cues.  Visceral factors, 
such as sexual desire, activate and increase the bargaining power of the short term i nterest to 
satisfy this desire. If such behavior is in conflict with a long term interest a rational individual may 
                                                           
8 See also Slovic (2001) 
9 See also e.g., Ditto et al., (2006) 
10 See also; Thaler & Shefrin (1981); Laibson (1998; 2001); Bénabou & Pycia (2002); Loewenstein, O‟Donoghue, & Rabin (2003); 
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have incentives to act strategically in terms of the formation of personal rules. According to Ainslie, 
personal rules are “commitments made in the mind where the stake is nothing but the credibility 
of the individual to himself” (Ainslie, 2001, p.94). Most commonly, personal rules bundle rewards 
so that the present temptation is not only weighed against one reward in the future, but rather to 
a set of rewards.
11 
During the last decade, Ainslie‟s ideas have been explicitly incorporated in economic models 
for  time-inconsistent  behavior.  The  perhaps  most  comprehensive  work  has  been  done  by 
Bénabou and Tirole (2002; 2004).
12 Bénabou and Tirole argue that individuals  have incomplete 
information regarding their ability t o resist short term temptations and th erefore rely on past 
actions as indicators of  character.  In their 2002 paper, Bénabou and Tirole show that the 
presence of hyperbolic discounting may create incentives for an individual to engage in strategic 
behavior in terms of sending potentially self -deceiving signals to future selves concerning their 
ability to resist temptations. Bénabou and Tirole (2004) focus on the intrinsic motivation for rule 
based behavior. In addition to the incomplete information regarding ability, Bénabou and Tirole 
(2004) assume that individuals have imperfect recall concerning  relapses and situational factors 
affecting the cost to abstain from indulgence in short term temptations.  Failure to persevere 
signals  a character of  low ability to future selves   and may thereby  contribute to  continuing 
impulsive behavior. However, incomplete information of situational factors related to the cost of 
abstaining enables an attribution of the  failure to persevere to external circumstances,  and thus 
allows future selves to rationalize past behavior. 
The rationale for both signaling high ability to future selves and for rationalizing past behavior 
in Bénabou and Tirole (2002; 2004) in part stems from the assumption that individuals derive 
utility from having a positive self -image.  In a series of  psychological  experiments, Festinger 
(1957) and Aronson (1968) showed that participants who voluntarily engaged in behavior 
inconsistent with their self-image afterwards rationalized their behavior in order to maintain a 
consistent self-concept. According to  cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Aronson, 1968; 
1992),  inconsistent  behavior  has  a  tendency  to  create  a  negative  physical  arousal  (cognitive 
dissonance),  and  therefore  to  create  incentives  to  either  change  behavior,  preferences  or  to 
change the evaluation of the behavior that caused the arousal.
13  Aronson (1992) suggests that 
most individuals strive for 3 things: 1) to preserve a consistent and predictable sense of self, 2) to 
preserve a competent sense of self, and 3) to preserve a mora lly good sense of self.  Hence, an 
                                                           
11 The violation of a personal rule reduces the credibility of that rule and thus sends a signal to the individual that he is unlikely to 
follow the rule in the future. Hence, giving in to a temptation is thus associated with a greater cost than if only the particular 
situation at hand is considered (Ainslie, 2001). 
12See also e.g., Broccas and Carrillo (2008); Fudenberg & Levine (2006); Gul & Pesendorfer (2001) 




individual  that  engages  in  behavior  that  either  questions  his/her  intelligence  or  that  induces 
feelings  of  guilt  will  experience  incentives  to  perform  dissonance  reducing  behavior.
14 
Accordingly, dissonance theory predicts that people will in general use all available information 
before  making  a  decision.  However,  after  the  decision  has  been  made  they  will  tend  to  seek 
reassurance that they did the right thing.
15 
States of physiological arousal have a potentially important role for rationalization t endencies 
since high levels of arousal severely diminish the ability to judge future consequences of current 
behavior.
16 Engagement in risky behavior threatens our self-image as competent individuals and 
may therefore give rise to anxiety.
17 Indeed, a number of studies in psychology suggest that 
individuals that engage in high risk behavior tend to underestimate their personal risk in 
comparison to similar others, and that some individuals displays  maladaptive coping strategies 
such as a defensive denial of risk.
18 Hence, in order to fully understand persistent sexual risk 
taking it may be important to include self-image maintenance in the analysis.   
In their seminal paper from 1982, Akerlof & Dickens use ideas from cognitive dissonance 
theory in order to analyze the economic consequences of risk taking behavior at the work place. 
In accordance with Aronson (1968; 1992), Akerlof and Dickens argue that accepting an exposure 
to risk questions the individual‟s intelligence, and thereby creates incentives to rationalize past 
behavior. In the setting of their theoretical model, rationalization is modeled as understating the 
risk  taken.  Applied  on  worker  safety,  Akerlof  &  Dicken‟s  theoretical  results  suggest  that 
insufficient supply of safety insurance in one period may induce underestimation of risk, and thus 
insufficient demand for insurance, in proceeding periods. 
The model developed in this paper builds on the ideas as developed by Akerlof and Dickens 
(1982), O‟Donoghue & Rabin (2000), Loewenstein & O‟Donoghue (2007) and Bénabou & Tirole 
(2002;  2004).  However,  whereas  Akerlof  and  Dickens  model  the  exposure  to  health  risk  as 
exogenously given (i.e. insurance is only available in time period 2) the model presented in this 
paper assumes that the individual himself chooses the amount of risk to be exposed to (in terms 
of the decision to use condoms or not). Endogenous exposure to risk is implicitly incorporated in 
O‟Donoghue  &  Rabin  (2000),  Loewenstein  &  O‟Donoghue  (2007)  and Bénabou  and  Tirole 
(2002; 2004). However,  the O‟Donoghue &  Rabin (2000),  and Loewenstein  &  O‟Donoghue 
(2007) papers end with the analysis of how affect may give rise to excessive sexual risk taking. In 
contrast, the model presented in this paper continues with an analysis of how myopic behavior 
                                                           
14 Aronson (1992) 
15 Aronson (1989) 
16 See e.g. Tiedens and Linton (2001); Loewenstein & Lerner (2003) 
17 See e.g. Weinstein (1984); van der Pligt et al. (1993); van der Pligt (1996) 
18 See e.g. Offir, et al. (1993); van der Pligt et al. (1993); Abdool Karim et al. (1995); van der Pligt (1996); Varga (1997a; 2001); 
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affects incentives in future time periods. The Bénabou and Tirole (2002; 2004) papers provide an 
exquisite analysis of the development of behavior over time. The approach taken in this paper 
differs from Bénabou and Tirole in terms of an explicit incorporation of the role of cognitive 
dissonance and rationalizing behavior and in terms of the assumption of full information about 
preferences and past behavior. To my knowledge, no one has to date linked theories of myopic 
behavior  with  those  of  rationalizing  behavior  in  relation  to  sexual  risk  taking  behavior.  The 
model presented in this paper tries to fill this gap. 
The  remaining  part  of  the  paper  is  outlined  as  follows:  In  order  to  build  up  a  basic 
understanding of the model mechanisms, I first develop a basic model for strategic interaction 
between  short-term  and  long-term  interests  concerning  sexual  choices  under  affect.  I  then 
introduce the opportunity to rationalize past behavior and analyze how the presence of cognitive 
dissonance affects sexual behavior, subjective risk evaluation and incentives to invest in self-
control.  
2. Theoretical approach 
2.1 A basic model for sexual behavior 
Consider an individual (for simplicity treated as a “he”) that lives during 3 time periods. The 
rationale for using the non-standard framework of 3 time-periods is that this approach enables us 
to analyze both incentives to and effects of rationalizing behavior. Although the assumption of 3 
time-periods is not strictly needed for the first part of the analysis, the assumption is maintained 
in order to give an overview of the full model. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible 
I assume a separable lifetime utility function. This assumption enables an analysis focused on 
sexual behavior.  
In each time period, the individual is assumed to face an exogenous supply of attractive sexual 
opportunities.
19 The individual‟s choice set is thus constituted by whether sexual experiences are 
to be safe or unsafe. Safe sex is defined as sex with a condom, where condoms are assumed to 
provide a 100 percent protection against sexually transmitted infections such as HIV, but also to 
insert a cost in terms of reducing pleasure of sexual consumption.
20 Finally, in order to enable the 
                                                           
19 Naturally, to be correct sexual decisions should be modeled as a bargaining process between two parties. The model presented 
in this paper treats “sexual opportunities” as exogenous. In other words, the individual is assumed to meet an exogenous number 
of sexually attractive, and willing, individuals.   
20 Condoms naturally also have monetary costs. However, in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, and since the 
analysis does not consider budget constraints other than the constraint related to h ealth, monetary costs of condom use are 
neglected in the analysis below. Non-monetary costs related to condom use are, for example, physical reduction in sensation and 
social stigma. Social norms prescribe behaviors considered consistent with being a membe r of a particular social group. 




analysis of cognitive dissonance in the augmented version of the model I assume that, if the 
individual contracts HIV in time period 1 or  2,  he dies at the end of time period 2.
21 This 
assumption reflects the relatively long incubation time of AIDS. The simplifying assumption that 
an HIV infected individual dies at the end of time period 2 regardless of whether HIV is 
contracted in time period 1 or 2 is relatively strong and does have implications for the analysis 
since it implies that the marginal disutility of contracting HIV in the second period is lower than 
contracting HIV in the first period. However, the assumption enables analytical re sults and may 
be justified if older individuals in general are more vulnerable to infections such as influenza and 
pneumonia. Following O‟Donoghue & Rabin (2000) and Loewenstein & O‟Donoghue (2007), I 
assume that a rational individual does not discount the future.
22 The individual‟s preferences in 
period   are described by the lifetime utility function,  
 
 
(1)   
where represents the exogenous supply of sexual encounters in each time-period, and   is the 
endogenous  share  of  sexual  acts  in  which  condoms  are  used  in  each  time  period. 
, represents the per-coital probability of staying HIV negative, where    is 
the  probability  of  acquiring  HIV  through  one  unprotected  sexual  act.
23  Since  the supply of 
attractive sexual opportunities is assumed exogenous in the model,  , a constant, represents 
the maximal pleasure derived from sexual opportunities. The individual‟s decision alternatives are 
constituted by whether or not to use a condom during the sexual intercourse. As mentioned 
above, condoms are likely to reduce sexual pleasure in terms of interrupted foreplay, reduced 
sensitivity and perhaps a sense of awkwardness. In equation (1),   represents the subjective 
cost of using condoms. Consider the following functional form for  , 
    (2)   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
symptom of STI:s within a certain community, using condoms may imply cost in terms of social stigma and lowered self-esteem. 
Finally, the cost of condoms is also related to availability, as having a condom readily available in the heat of the moment in the 
pocket constitutes a lower cost than having to run to the store in order to buy one. 
21 Without treatment, HIV progresses into AIDS in approximately 10 years. Now, assuming that the individual does not use 
treatment is clearly a stark simplification. However, even if antiretroviral (ARV) treatment is used, HIV is associated with  a 
shortened life span (e.g.Lakdawalla et al. (2006); Mechoulan (2007); UNAIDS (2009); Rao et al. (2006).  In addition, in many poor 
countries, many individuals do not know their HIV status until they develop AIDS, and ARV‟s are nowhere nearly available for 
all.  
22 O‟Donoghue & Rabin (2000) argue that discounting the future should relate to the uncertainty of the future occurring. Hence, 
if the future is certain discounting of the future should not take place. Although the future is always to some extent uncertain, 
including discounting in the model presented in this paper would not add to the analysis.  
23   in turn is the product of two probabilities; the probability that the sexual partner has HIV, and the probability of HIV 
transmission given that the partner has HIV.  Risk and Rationalization – the role of affect... 
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This functional form suggests that condom related costs increase with the level of condom use, 
i.e.,  . Note that  .  , is thus the net pleasure 
of  sex.  Hence,  as  implied  by  equation  (1)  and  (2),  the  individual‟s  maximization  problem  is 
constituted by weighing the cost of using condoms, in terms of the reduction in sexual pleasure, 
to the benefit of protecting against health hazards such as HIV.  
Before we analyze the effect of sexual arousal on risk-taking behavior, let us first define the 
solution for a rational individual without myopic tendencies. This solution is labeled First Best 
(FB) below, as it does not contain any preference reversal. Defining 
 as the total amount of unprotected sex consumed and maximizing equation (1) with respect 
to   and   produces the following first order conditions 
     (3)   
 
     (4)   
 
     (5)   
 
Equation (3)-(5), implicitly defines the optimal levels of condom use in each time period as 
functions of the risk of acquiring HIV. Let us define the optimal level of condom use in the first 
best scenario,  . As can be seen in the equations (3)-(5), a rational individual 
without  myopic  tendencies  maximizes  lifetime  utility  by  equating  the  marginal  cost  of  using 
condoms, as depicted by the first terms on the left hand side of the equations, to the marginal 
benefit in terms of a reduction in the risk of dying prematurely. Note that a rational individual 
optimally sets  ,  since there is no risk associated with unprotected sex in time period 3.  
Now,  as  suggested  by  Loewenstein  (1996)  and  Ainslie  (2001),  the  long  term  interest  to 
maximize lifetime utility may differ from the short term interest to maximize sexual pleasure. 
Accordingly,  let  us  assume  that  the  individual  consist  of  a  sequence  of  different  selves  (or 
interests) whose individual objective functions may differ in the evaluation of long term costs. 
Let us start by assuming that the individual can be divided into two different selves in each 
time period; one long term interest, represented by a forward looking and rational self striving to 
maximize lifetime utility, and one short term interest, represented by a sexually aroused self. Let 
us denote the long term interest LRt, and the short term interest in each time period SRt, where 




In each time period, the individual is assumed to be exposed to exogenous shocks in terms of 
affective stimuli (such as the opportunity to engage in sexual activities). During states of affect, 
the short-term interest is assumed to have the executive power. The timing of the sex model is 
depicted in Figure 1, below.  
 
Figure 1: Timing of sexual decisions 
 
At the onset of each time period, LRt is assumed to use all available information to him at that 
point in time to maximize lifetime utility. However, LRt is not in actual charge of future sexual 
decisions. The exposure to affective stimuli, in terms attractive sexual opportunities, gives rise to 
sexual arousal which is assumed to transfer the executive power to a more short sighted self 
(SRt).
 24 As the sexual arousal subsides, the individual is assumed to enter time-period 2 and the 
preferences of farsighted interests once again surmount. At the onset of time period 2 the long 
term interest (LR2) is thus assumed to act in order to maximize the remaining lifetime utility. As 
in period 1, the individual in period 2 is assumed to get exposed to exogenous affective stimuli 
that transfer decision power to a shortsighted interest. If sexual risk taking in period 1 or 2 results 
in  an HIV infection, the individual  is assumed  to die before  reaching  time  period 3.  If the 
individual does not catch HIV, long and short run selves in period three once again chooses 
optimal amounts of risky sex. After time period 3, the individual is assumed to die. Consequently, 
as unprotected casual sex in period 3 does not affect future utility, both long run and short run 
selves chooses unprotected sex consumption such that present utility is maximized (see equation 
(5)). In order to set the stage correctly, let us look closer at the behavior and objective functions 
of the affective selves. 
2.1.1 Sexual short term interests 
The true cost of engaging in unprotected sex in time period 1 is given by the risk of acquiring 
HIV times the utility loss;  . However, as mentioned in the introduction, 
                                                           
24 The intuition behind this assumption is that actual the decision of whether to use a condom or not is taken in the heat of the 
moment 
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strong physical arousal has a tendency to hamper rational decision making in terms of making the 
present  more  salient  and  reducing  the  ability  to  judge  the  future  consequences  of  current 
behavior.
25 Hence, the sexually aroused selves should intuitively display myopic tendencies and 
base their decisions on a heuristic decision rule rather than on  complex probability calculations. 
Consequently, it may be reasonable to assume that sexually aroused individuals base their risk 
evaluation on a line ar probability function such as   ,
  26 where,   
represents the individual‟s perception of the risk of acquiring HIV. In addition, Loewenstein and 
Lerner (2003) argue that expected emotions differ from immediate emotions.
27 This implies that the 
expected experience of an outcome is likely to differ from the actual, or immediate, experience of 
that outcome. In other words, an individual under affect should not be able to correctly judge the 
loss associated with dying prematurely. Taken together, this implies that the shortsighted self 
would base his sexual decisions on the following cost function: 
    (6)   
where  , is a discount factor. If we disregard the first constant term ( ) and 
denote the product,  , equation (6‟) transforms into:  
    (6’) 
The parameter   thus represents a sense of “worry”, or gut feeling, of taking a sexual risk. Now, 
the part of   that represents the risk of HIV could (or perhaps should) naturally to some extent 
be based on the true risk of an HIV infection (for example a weighted mean of some upper and 
lower  bound  of  ).  However,  including  a  mechanism  displaying  how    depends  on 
 would prevent us from deriving analytically tractable results. I therefore assume that 
sexual  arousal  creates  a  non-transparent  “veil  of  ignorance”  that  keeps  the  individual  from 
estimating the true probability of acquiring HIV through engagement in unprotected casual sex.
28 
Consider the objective function and first order condition for the sexually aroused self in time 
period 1:  
    (7)   
 
                                                           
25 Immediate emotions affect the decision maker‟s expectations about both the probability and the desirability of the future 
consequences. For example, good moods generally make people more optimistic about the probability of positive outcomes, and 
of their future experience of the outcomes of a certain behavior (e.g., Loewenstein et al., 2001; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). 
26 See, e.g. Griffin et al. (1999) 
27 See also, e.g., Loewenstein et al., (2003) 
28 This assumption may be justified by the energy consumption of the short term interest of getting laid; there is just too little 






(8)   
Equation (8) defines the optimal level of condom use as seen by the myopic self in period 1. Let 
us denote the short term optimal level of condom use  . From equation (2), (6‟) 
and (7) it is easily seen that   is given by:   
    (9)   
In order to evaluate the effect of myopic preferences, let us compare the optimal level of condom 
use as defined by equation (9) to the level of condom use implicitly defined by equations (3)-(5). 
Remember that, since sexual activities in time period 3 are “risk free”, condom use in time period 
three is optimally set equal to zero. Hence,  . Consider the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1 
If sexual arousal disables consequence analysis and if   then  . More 
specifically: 
a)  If the risk, or the potential utility loss, associated with unprotected sex is underestimated, condom use by 
sexually  aroused  agents  will  be  lower  than  in  the  first  best  scenario,  i.e.,   
then   . 
b)  If the risk, or the potential utility loss, associated with unprotected sex is overestimated, condom use by 
sexually  aroused  agents  will  be  higher  than  in  the  first  best  scenario,  i.e.,   
then   . 
Proof. See the appendix 
The intuition behind proposition 1 is relatively straight forward. If affect disables the ability to 
correctly  evaluate  future  consequences  of  current  behavior,  sexually  aroused  individuals  are 
forced to base decisions on a more or less vague sense of the danger involved in unprotected 
sex.
29  In  addition,  the  presence  of  the  discounting  factor  β  always  makes  the  individual  to 
underestimate  the  future  cost  of  current  risk  taking.  Consequently,  if  the  marginal  risk  of 
acquiring HIV, based on the linear probability function in equation (6‟) is smaller or equal to the 
true probability of an HIV infection, then sexually aroused individuals will always over consume 
risky sex. However, there may be instances when a risk perception based on the linear probability 
function  actually  underestimates  the  true  risk  of  acquiring  HIV.  In  addition,  although  the 
                                                           
29 In the model presented in this paper,   represents this sense of risk.  is treated as an exogenous parameter and is thus 
assumed to be completely detached from the true probability distribution for  . In reality,   should, although distorted, 
naturally have some base in  . Risk and Rationalization – the role of affect... 
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scenario is not very likely, some individuals may also overestimate the experienced cost of an 
HIV infection. If the overestimation of the marginal risk of acquiring HIV or the expected utility 
loss from an HIV infection is sufficiently large, there may actually exist instances where sexually 
aroused individuals consumes less unsafe sex than in the first best scenario. In both cases the 
inability to correctly judge the risk associated with unprotected casual sex, will give rise to a 
behavior that is inconsistent with the individual‟s long term interests.  
The  scenario  described  by  proposition  1  is  somewhat  unrealistic.  Although  some  of  us 
admittedly  feel completely  unable  to control affective  urges, most individuals do exert some 
control  even  during  states  of  affect.  Let  us  therefore  analyze  how  access  to  self  controlling 
measures affect behavior in the presence of affect induced myopia.  
2.1.2 Self control 
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  Ainslie  (2001)  argues  that  farsighted  interest  may  act 
strategically in terms of forming personal rules in order to prevent short term indulgence in 
destructive  behavior.  Accordingly,  let  us  assume  that  forward  looking  selves  can  invest  in 
measures that provide future selves with incentives to abstain from excessive risk taking. More 
specifically, let us assume that LR1 and LR2 have access to instruments that reduces the cost of 
using condoms for the sexually aroused self. Now, it should be noted that these investments 
cannot be seen as personal rules in a strict sense. Personal rules should be related to an intrinsic 
cost of violating the rule in terms of sending a signal of failure to the individual. In addition, a 
violation of the personal rule should reduce the credibility of the rule for future decisions.
30 These 
mechanisms are  not included in the   model presented in this paper . Instead, the self-control 
measures suggested here relates to a reduction in the cost of condom use, for example in terms of 
buying condoms beforehand or by investing time and effort to reduce the actual cost of  using 
condoms.  
I introduce instruments available to the long run interests as investments conducted by the 
long run selves in each time period respectively. Let   for   represent the 
instrument available to the long run self in each time period. The lower   is, the lower is the 
subjective cost of using a condom by sexually aroused selves assumed to be. The self control 
augmented subjective cost of using condoms is given by: 
                                                           
30 The idea of a personal rule is to bundle costs and rewards such that short term interests are persuaded to act in accordance with 
long term goals. In other words, giving in today sends a signal to the individual that he will always give in is thus associated with a 







The  functional  form  specified  in  equation  (2‟)  implies  that,  ,  and 
 Further if  ,  . However, setting   low cannot be done 
without effort; making sure that condoms are available, practicing, or talking to a potential sexual 
partner about using condoms beforehand may take both time and energy. Let us therefore define 




(10)   
The functional form of equation (10) suggests that the lower the individual wants to set  , the 
more it is going to cost him in terms of effort ( , and  ), Note that, if  , then 
. The introduction of potential investments in self control implies that the life time 
utility function in equation (1) is now given by: 
 
 
(1’)        
 
Perfect  foresight  implies  that  LR1  knows  that  SR1  will  treat    as  exogenously  given  when 
choosing  .  The  first  order  condition  for  SR1  thus  defines    as  a 
function of the investment made by LR1 in the previous time-period. The first order condition 




(11)   
for t=1,2, since   is now given by   . Equation (11) defines the 
optimal  level  of  self-control  investments  in  each  time  period.  Let  us  define  this  level  of 
investment;  , where   stands for Self-Control and  . The first 
order condition in equation (11) suggests that a forward looking self maximizes utility by equating 
the marginal cost of investing in self-control to the marginal benefit. As can be seen in equation 
(11), the marginal cost of investments in self-control is constituted by both the direct investment 
                                                           
31 As is clear from equation (10), for   the function is undefined. Hence to be strict   . However, as   
approaches zero, the cost of investments in self-control approaches infinity, thus implying that the individual will never find 
it optimal to set  . Risk and Rationalization – the role of affect... 
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cost and by a cost related to the increase in condom use. The marginal benefit of investments in 
self-control relates to the reduction in condom cost at a given level of condom use, and by the 
increased  probability  of  surviving  to  old  age.  Let  us  now  analyze  how  the  availability  of 
investments  in  self  control  affects  sexual  choices  in  the  sex  model.  Consider  the  following 
proposition:  
Proposition 2 
In the absence of myopic tendencies, a forward looking individual does not invest in self control, i.e.,  . 
However, if the individual has myopic tendencies, and if  , we can no longer rule out 
an interior solution for investments in self control, i.e.,  . 
Proof. See the appendix 
The intuition behind proposition 2 is relatively straight forward. If long run interests do not have 
executive power over behavior in aroused states, they are forced to act strategically in order to 
constrain the decisions of future short-sighted interests. In other words, the knowledge that we, 
in the heat of the moment, tend to do things that we later regret creates incentives to bolster our 
ability to refrain from these foolish decisions. Hence, if practicing to put on a condom, or talking 
to potential sexual partners about condom use, relieves the tension of using condoms, this may 
constitute a way of reaching closer to our long term goals.   
Until now, we have limited our analysis to a somewhat trivial model of investments in self-
control in the presence of sexual myopia. This analysis was carried out to set the stage for the 
main topic of this paper; the presence of cognitive dissonance and its effect on sexual behavior. 
Let us therefore briefly discuss how the presence of cognitive dissonance changes the timing of 
the model, and the choice set of the long run selves in time period 1 and 2. 
2.2 A Model for sexual rationalization 
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  cognitive  science  suggests  that  individual  well-being  is 
dependent on having a coherent and positive self-concept. Hence, if myopic tendencies induces 
excessive  risk  taking,  then  future  interests  to  minimize  suffering  may  well  give  rise  to 
rationalization tendencies. Let us therefore extend the previous analysis and assume that the 
individual has an additional short-term self whose main interest is to reduce anxiety and maintain 





Figure 2: Timing of decisions related to sexual behavior and rationalization 
As before, LR1 is assumed to use all available information in order to maximize lifetime utility, 
but not to be in charge of the actual decision making during states of sexual affect. However, the 
introduction of cognitive dissonance implies that, if the individual engages in excessive risk taking 
in time period t.1, he will now experience negative physical arousal in terms of anxiety in time 
period t.2. Hence, if decisions in previous periods have resulted in excessive risk taking, a new 
short run self with the interest to minimize HIV related anxiety will surmount as the individual 
enters time period 1.2. This short sighted self (SR1.2) myopically strives to maintain a positive self-
image  in  terms  of  rationalizing  past  behavior.  Rationalization  is  modeled  as  a  subjective 
evaluation of personal risk of acquiring HIV during an unprotected sex act. As in the above, the 
true per-coital probability of remaining HIV negative is given by,  .  Let us define the subjective 
per-coital probability or remaining HIV negative, as chosen by SR1.2,  .  
After tackling the aftermath of the sexual activity, the individual is assumed to enter time 
period 2 were the long term interest (LR2) maximizes the remaining lifetime utility. However, if 
SR1.2 has rationalized past behavior, in terms of choosing  , LR2‟s decisions will not be 
based on the true risk of acquiring HIV from an unprotected sexual act but rather on  .  As in 
period 1, the individual in period 2 is assumed to get exposed to exogenous affective stimuli that 
create myopic behavior in period 2.1, and potentially rationalizing behavior in time period 2.2.  
Since the individual is assumed to die after time period 3, rationalization in period 2 has no 
effect on sexual behavior in time period 3. Consequently, since rationalization in period 2 has no 
future costs this aspect is ignored in the analysis below. Before we turn to the analysis of the 
effect of rationalization opportunities on sexual behavior and investments in self control, let us 
briefly discuss the cognitive dissonance function. This is done in the next section.   
   
1 LR 2 LR
1 . 1 1 . 2 2 . 1 2 . 2
3 LR
1 . 3 2 . 3
















TimeRisk and Rationalization – the role of affect... 
15 
 
2.2.1 Rationalizing short term interests 
Voluntary involvement in unsafe sexual activities implies that the individual exposes himself to 
the risk of dying prematurely.
32 Hence, in accordance with the ideas of Aronson (1968), this type 
of behavior questions may  question the individual‟s self-image as an intelligent and responsible 
individual (and induce fear of premature death). In our model this implies that, if  ,  and if 
, the individual experiences a sense of anxiety and an urge to restore the consistency of 
his self-concept in terms of seeking information affirming that the decision taken was the right 
one.  This  may  for  example  imply  that  the  individual  downplay  his  sexual  partner‟s  relative 
riskiness. Hence, in the analysis below, the restoration of a positive self-image is assumed to be 
carried out in terms of rationalizing past behavior. 
Naturally, the restoration of a positive and coherent self-image does not come without costs. 
Rationalization  implies  that  the  individual  needs  to  use  effort  to  convince  himself  that  his 
preferred perception of his behavior is the correct one. However, for simplicity this aspect of 
rationalization costs will be disregarded here. More importantly, rationalization of personal risk 
distorts the information set of future selves. Since the individual‟s perception of the riskiness of 
past behavior is likely to be based on the risk of acquiring HIV, rationalization implies changing 
his perception of the per-coital survival probability.  
Before we define the cognitive dissonance function, let us define the main characteristics that 
should  be  included  in  this  function  to  make  it  consistent  with  cognitive  dissonance  theory. 
Define   as the optimal level of subjective personal survival probability from the perspective of 
SR1.2. The cognitive dissonance function should then have the following characteristics:  
1) If there is no risk involved in a certain behavior, there will be no need to rationalize behavior, 
i.e.,  
    (12)   
2) If an individual has not engaged in any risk taking in previous time periods there should not be 
any need to rationalize behavior, i.e. 
    (13)   
A cognitive dissonance function which meets these requirements is given by:  
 
  (14)   
                                                           
32 The anxiety could naturally also be related to the social stigma associated with being HIV positive. However, the analysis of 




where    is  a  scale  parameter  measuring  the  negative  arousal  caused  by  having  an 
inconsistent  self-concept  (or  the  fear  of  premature  death).  In  other  words,  as  long  as  the 
individual does not engage in sexual risk taking (  or  ), cognitive dissonance will never 
arise.
33 However, if past behavior involves sexual risk, the individual will experience a  threat 
towards his self-image and enter into a state of negative physical arousal. As in the case of sexual 
arousal, affect due to cognitive dissonance is assumed to hamper the individual‟s ability to judge 
the future consequences of current behavior. Remember that the true consequences of choosing 
a personal risk of HIV ( ) that diverge from the true level of HIV risk ( ) is that future selves may 
underestimate the risk of an HIV infection. In other words, the cost of rationalization is the 
increased risk of premature death, as given by: 
    (15)   
As in the case of sexual arousal, the heightened arousal associated with anxiety is likely to affect 
the cognitive capacity to evaluate the future consequences of a given decision. Psychological 
research suggest that while positive moods are associated with heuristic information processing, 
negative  moods  are  associated  with  a  more  systematic  information  processing.  However, 
extremely negative states of affect, such as fear, also seem to be associated with a heuristic 
information processing or avoidance.
34 Since an HIV infection is still associated with premature 
death in most instances, it may be reasonable to assume that a potential HIV infection causes the 
individual to experience fear. Consequently, an individual that suspects that his previous behavior 
has exposed him to HIV  is unlikely to engage in complex probability calcul ations, but rather to 
rely on heuristics. In addition, since affect reduces the ability to judge future consequences of 
current  behavior,  an  individual  experiencing  fear  should  not  consider  the  behavioral 
consequences of rationalization (i.e. the effect of rationalization on future condom use). Instead, 
the individual is once again assumed to rely on a heuristic approach to evaluate the future cost of 
current behavior in terms of the function: 
 
  (16)   
Drawing intuition from equation (14), it may be appropriate to include condom use in period 
1 in the heuristic approach specified in equation (16). However, including previous condom use 
                                                           
33 To be correct, cognitive dissonance should be a function of the deviation between actual behavior and the individual‟s self-
image as an intelligent and competent person. It is naturally possible that the individual has a self-image that is consistent with 
some degree of risk taking behavior. This specification implies that   is replaced with   in equation (14), where 
 is the level of condom use that is consistent with the individuals self-image as an intelligent person. However, using this 
specification  we  cannot  guarantee  that    for  .  For  simplicity  I  therefore  treat  the  personal  norm  as  not 
engaging in sexual risk taking at all.  
34 See, e.g. Griffin et al. (1999) Risk and Rationalization – the role of affect... 
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linearly  in  equation  (16)  makes  subjective  personal  risk  independent  of  past  behavior  (see 
footnote  36).  Since  this seems highly unrealistic,  I assume  that the  cost of rationalization is 
independent of past condom use. The short run self in time period 1.2 thus strives to minimize 
cognitive dissonance by minimizing the function: 
    (17)   
Let us briefly analyze the function specified in equation (17). The first part of   
is  associated  with  anxiety  related  to  previous  risk  taking  behavior  while  the  second  part  is 
associated  with  the  perceived  cost  of  self-deception.  Note  that  the  short  term  interest  to 
minimize anxiety takes condom use in previous time periods as given. Minimizing equation (17) 





(18)   
Equation  (18)  implies  that,  if  ,  and    then  cognitive  dissonance  will  create 
incentives to rationalize by setting  . Hence, if the actions of the short term interest in 
time  period  1.1  results  in  excessive  risk  taking,  cognitive  dissonance  will  induce  an 
underestimation of personal risk in time period 1.2. This in turn affects distorts the information 
set of the long run interest in time period 2. If, on the other hand,   or  , the 
individual does not experience any anxiety and therefore evaluates personal risk rationally. We are 
now ready to analyze the effects of sexual arousal and rationalizing tendencies on condom use 
and investments in self control. Consider the cognitive dissonance augmented utility function, as 




(19)   
                                                           
35 Including condom use in equation (16) implies that the individual minimizes the expression: 
 
Thus implying an optimal level of   equal to: 
 
The alternative is to include a quadratic term in equation (14) and a linear term in equation (16). However, this does not change 
the results in the analysis below. In order to facilitate exposition I therefore disregard the effect of condom use in time period 1 




Under perfect foresight, the long run and forward looking self in time period 1 (LR1) rationally 
observes future costs and benefits of engaging in unprotected sex. As in section 2.1, perfect 
foresight implies that LR1 knows that SR1.1 will treat  , as set by LR1, as exogenously given when 
choosing  .  The  first  order  condition  for  SR1.1  thus  defines    (see 
equation (11)). Since the decision variables for LR1 is constituted by  , let us in the following for 
simplicity denote  . The rationale for including the    function in 
the objective function for the long run self in time period 1 is that the long run self knows that if 
the  behavioral  choices  of  the  short  sighted  self  in  time  period  1.1  implies  an  excessive 
engagement in sexual risk taking, this will cause the individual to experience anxiety in time 
period 1.2. Further, with perfect foresight, LR1 also knows that SR1.2 will set   by minimizing 
the cognitive dissonance function and treating   as exogenously given. Hence, if LR1 has 
perfect foresight and is rational, he will treat   as a function of 




Finally, LR1 rationally anticipates that LR2 treats the subjective personal HIV risk, as chosen by 
the short run self in time period 1.2 ( ), as the true level of survival probability and thus base 
his investment decisions on this parameter rather than on  .
36 This implies that the objective 








(21)   
Note that, since    is a function of  ,    and 
 will also be functions of  . Hence, with perfect foresight, LR1 sets   in 
                                                           
36 In the model presented in this paper, rationalization is assumed to always be successful, in terms of completely changing the 
information set for future selves. Risk and Rationalization – the role of affect... 
19 
 
order to maximize equation (19), treating the choices of future selves as functions of  . The 




As is clear from equation (19‟), I assume that the individual only experiences anxiety due to past 
risk taking in time period 1.2. In reality, as long as   and  , people are likely to 
experience anxiety from time to time even in later time periods. However, although including 
anxiety in time period 2 as a function of   would be an interesting extension of the model, this 
would  not  allow  us  to  derive  analytically  tractable  results.  Let  us  therefore  assume  that  the 
cognitive dissonance cost is only experienced in time period 1.2. Further, in order get a clearer 
intuition and simplify the analysis below, let us make the following assumption: 
Assumption 1 
The  direct effect of  condom use on  cognitive dissonance outweighs the indirect effect,  i.e. 
∗ 1 ∗. 
In order to see the rationale for assumption 1, note that the total effect of condom use on the 
anxiety associated with cognitive dissonance is given by: 
 
  (22)   
The first term in equation (22) describes the reduction in anxiety associated with a lower level of 
risk  taking  behavior  and  is  negative  by equation  (14).  The  first part  of  the  second  term  in 
equation (22) is positive  from equation (14) and describes how an increase in the subjective 
survival probability reduces the anxiety associated with unprotected sex. Finally,   is 
associated with the reduced need to rationalize at higher levels of condom use and is negative by 
equation (18‟). Taken together, equation (22) implies that an increase in condom use has two 
effects in opposite directions on anxiety. The direct effect of increased condom use reduces 
anxiety, but since an increase in condom use also reduces the optimal level of   ,  an increase 




net reduction in the anxiety related to sexual risk taking. In order to facilitate the presentation 
below, let us also define:  
       
       
       
Maximizing equation (19‟) with respect to    produces the first order condition:  
 
 
(23)   
 
 can be partitioned into: 
 
 
(24)   
 
where   relates to the direct effect of condom use in time period 1 on incentives to 
invest  in  self-control  in  time  period  2,  and    relates  to  the 
indirect via rationalization. Let us briefly analyze the first order condition in equation (23). The 
expression within the first square bracket pertains to the within-period marginal benefits and 
costs of investments in   and thus corresponds to the first order condition in equation (11). 
However, when the individual has the ability to rationalize past behavior, investments in self-
control have additional costs and benefits. The term within the second square bracket in equation 
(23) describes the marginal effect of investments in self-control on anxiety caused by cognitive 
dissonance and thus on incentives to engage in denial of risk. The term within the last square 
bracket corresponds to the first order condition for the forward looking self in time period 2 
evaluated at  . Finally, as can be seen in equation (24), investments in self-control in time period 
1 affects investment incentives in time period 2 both in terms of the effect on condom use in 
time period 1 and thus on the probability of being HIV negative, and in terms of changing the 
information set due to rationalization.  Risk and Rationalization – the role of affect... 
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Now, the main question asked in this paper is how affect induced myopia and rationalization 
tendencies affect sexual risk taking. In order to answer these questions, we need to analyze how 
rationalization affects the incentives to invest in self-control in time period 2. Let us therefore 
take a closer look at the two last parts of equation (23).  
From equation (2‟) and (18‟) and given assumption 1, the term within the second square bracket 
of  equation  (23)  is  negative.  Hence,  investments  in  self-control  in  time  period  1  have  the 
additional direct marginal benefit of reducing cognitive dissonance. However, since investments 
in  self-control also affects incentives to rationalize  personal  risk  it also indirectly  affects the 
incentives facing the forward looking self in time period 2. Let us denote the expression within 
the last square bracket in equation (23)  . If  , then  . However, with 
  it  may  be  the  case  that  ,  since  the  forward  looking  self  maximizes 
perceived utility by setting  . Hence, in order to determine how rationalization 
tendencies affect incentives to engage in unsafe sex and invest in self-control we need to analyze 
the sign of  .  
It can be shown that the marginal effect of rationalization on sexual risk taking hinge on 
whether rationalization causes the forward looking self in time period 2 to under- or overestimate 
the marginal cost of unprotected sex. The effect can be summarized by the term:
37 
    (25)   
where   relates to the true marginal effect of an unprotected sexual act on survival 
probability, and    is the marginal effect as perceived by a rationalizing individual. 
It can further be shown that the sign of equation (25) depends on the perceived risk of being 
HIV positive upon entrance in time period 2. As is shown in the appendix, this effect is captured 
by the expression:  
    (26)   
 
If  equation (26) is positive,  a marginal  increase  in   implies that the  marginal  risk  of an 
unprotected  sexual  act  is  underestimated.  However,  if    is  sufficiently  high,  or  if    is 
sufficiently low,   may be negative. In this case, a marginal increase in   
actually  causes  an  overestimation  of  the  perceived  marginal  risk  of  unprotected  sex,  due  to  a 
perceived increase in the probability of being HIV negative. Whether or investments in self-control 
in time period 1 increases or reduces incentives to invest in self-control in time period 2 in this 
                                                           
37 With a linear probability function of the kind   an increase in investments in self-control in time 
period 1 would unambiguously increase incentives to invest in self-control in time period 2. Calculations are available from the 




scenario depends on the relative effect of increased condom use on true and subjective survival 
probability. To see this, let us return to equation (24). The first term on the RHS in equation (24) 
relates to the direct effect of increased condom use in time period 1 on incentives to invest in 
self-control in time period 2. Since condom use increases the probability of being HIV negative 
in time period 2, and thus the marginal benefit of using condoms in this period, this term is 
unambiguously negative (see the appendix for a derivation of this result). The second term on the 
RHS in equation (24) relates to the indirect effect of condom use in time period 1 on incentives 
to invest in self-control in time period 2. As is shown in the appendix, the sign of this term 
hinges on the sign of equation (26). If equation (26) is negative, rationalization increases the 
perceived probability of being HIV negative in time period 2 and therefore makes the total effect 
of condom use on incentives to invest in self-control in time period 2 ambiguous. Consider the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 3 
3.1)   If  ,  rationalization  induces  an  underestimation  of  the  marginal  cost  of 
unprotected  sex  and  an  underinvestment  in  self-control  in  time  period  2.  This  creates  incentives  for 
precautionary savings in terms of overinvestment in self-control in time period 1 
3.2)   If  ,  rationalization  induces  an  overestimation  of  the  marginal  cost  of 
unprotected sex. However, incentives for investments in self-control in time period 1 depend on the relative 
magnitude of the direct and indirect effect of condom use on incentives to invest in self-control in time period 2: 
a.  If  , then the reduction in HIV risk due to increased condom use in 
time period 1 outweighs the perceived increase in perceived HIV risk due to reduced rationalization. In 
this case rationalization reduces incentives for investments in self-control in time period 1 
b.  If   then the reduction in HIV risk due to increased condom use in time 
period 1 is outweighed by the perceived reduction in HIV risk due to reduced rationalization. In this 
case rationalization creates incentives for precautionary savings in terms of higher investments in self-
control in time period 1. 
Proof. See the Appendix 
Investments in self-control in time period 1 have the direct benefit of reducing sexual risk 
taking and anxiety associated with cognitive dissonance in this period. In addition, due to the 
reduction in anxiety, investments in self-control in time period 1 reduce incentives to rationalize 
personal risk. Consequently, the more self-control used in time-period 1, the more correctly will 
the forward looking self in time-period 2 judge the risk of engaging in unprotected sex. However, Risk and Rationalization – the role of affect... 
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judging HIV risk more correctly does not necessarily imply more investments in self-control in 
time period 2. As mentioned above, the marginal benefit of an investment in self-control in time 
period 2 depends both on the perceived probability of acquiring HIV from an unprotected sexual 
act, and on the perceived probability of already being infected with HIV (i.e., the greater the 
probability of already having the virus, the smaller is the perceived benefit of abstaining from 
unprotected sex).
38  
Rationalization of personal risk contributes to an underestimation of  the per-coital risk of an 
HIV infection for an HIV negative individual. However, it also affects the perceived risk of being 
HIV positive. Put differently, an underestimation of personal HIV risk overestimates the probability 
of being HIV negative and thus the overestimates the perceived marginal benefit of abstaining from 
unprotected  sex.  The result in  Proposition  3.2 implies that, if the effect of an  increase in  the 
subjective appraisal of being HIV negative is greater than the reduction in the perceived per-
coital risk of an HIV infection, rationalization may lead to an overall increase in the perceived 
marginal cost of unprotected sex in time period 2.
39  Hence, from the perspective of the forward 
looking self in time period 1, rationalization may cause over -restrictive behavior in future time 
periods. However, even if investments in sel f-control in time period 1 reduces incentives to 
invest in self-control in time period 2 by reducing rationalization, the increase in condom use that 
follows from investments in self-control always increase the marginal benefit of condom use in 
time period 2 due to the reduced probability of being HIV positive.   
The results in Proposition 3.2 suggest that, if the effect of increased condom use outweighs the 
effect of reduced rationalization on the perceived probability of being HIV positive, investments 
in self-control in time period 1 always increases incentives to invest in self-control in time period 
2. This implies that, if rationalization induces an overestimation of the marginal cost of unsafe 
sex, the forward looking self in time period 1 has incentives to prevent exaggerated self-control in 
time period 2 by under-investing in self-control. If, on the other hand the effect of rationalization 
outweighs the direct effect of condom use, increased investment in self-control in time period 1 
reduces exaggerated self-control in time period 2. Hence, in this case, the forward looking self in 
time period 1 once again has incentives to engage in precautionary investments in self-control.  
The result in Proposition 3.2 may at first glance appear contra-intuitive. However, if HIV is 
perceived as more or less unavoidable, then from the perspective of the forward looking self in 
time period 1, investment in self-control in time-period 2 is a waste of resources. Hence, if 
rationalization induces an overestimation of the marginal cost of unsafe sex, it will cause future 
                                                           
38 Indeed, disregarding the self-deception effect, the higher sexual risk taking in period 1 is, the lower will the perceived 
marginal cost of unsafe sex in time period 2 be. 




selves to engage in over-restrictive behavior. Consequently, since investing in self-control in time 
period 1 reduces the risk of rationalization, the forward looking self in time period 1 will have 
incentives to promote condom use.  
So far we have assumed that individuals have perfect information about their rationalization 
tendencies. However, it may be reasonable to assume that individuals are more or less naïve 
about the  existence  and effects of cognitive dissonance. Let  us therefore briefly analyze the 
consequences of naïveté on investments in self control. This is done in the next section.  
3.2.1 Naïveté 
Naïve individuals are usually defined as individuals that do not realize that future behavior will 
be affected by myopic tendencies (including sexually induced myopia). However, since the main 
question  asked  in  this  paper  is  how  rationalization  affects  sexual  risk  taking  I  find  it  more 
interesting to focus the analysis on the cognitive dissonance aspect of naïveté. In addition, if the 
individual is completely naïve about sexually induced myopia, and the cost of investments in   
are sufficiently high, he will completely refrain from investments in  . Hence, condom use in 
equilibrium  will  be  the  same  as  when  self  control  measures  are  not  available  ( . 
Consequently, let us assume  that naïveté  only concerns rationalization tendencies and define 
 as a measure of the degree of naïveté. This implies the following definition of naïve 
and sophisticated individuals. 
Definition 2  
A completely sophisticated individual is an individual who is fully aware of myopic tendencies and rationalization 
behavior, i.e.,    
A  completely  naïve  individual  is  an  individual  who  is  aware  of  sexual  myopia but  who  is  ignorant  about 
rationalization tendencies, i.e.,   
An individual who is partially naïve about his rationalization tendencies is thus defined by   
 
A completely naïve individual is unaware of that unsafe sexual practices induces fear and 
rationalization in the future. This implies that naïve individuals ignore the effect of investments in 
self-control on rationalization and anxiety and thus treats   as exogenous and equal to   In 
addition, naïveté implies that the individual will disregard that the long run self in time period 2 
will base his investment decisions on  , and thus presume that equation (24) only includes 
the  first  term;  .  In  other  words,  a  completely 
naïve LR1 fails to include the indirect effect of rationalization, as depicted by the second term in Risk and Rationalization – the role of affect... 
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equation (24);  .  With the inclusion of naïveté, 





As can be seen in equation (28‟), the special case of   implies that the individual has 
perfect foresight and thus that the results from above hold. However, if  , the individual 
underestimates his tendency to rationalize past behavior.  , furthermore implies that the long 
forward looking self in period 1 does not consider the full cost of rationalization in terms of 
underestimation of HIV risk in time period 2. Consider the following proposition: 
Proposition 4 
Naïveté of self-deception tendencies contributes to an  increase in sexual risk taking in time period 1, i.e., 
.  
Proof. See the appendix 
Naïveté of self-deception tendencies prevents the individual from incorporating the full cost 
of engaging in unsafe sex and therefore results in excessive risk taking in time period 1. However, 
the incentives for increasing consumption of unprotected sex depend on the lifetime probability 
of acquiring HIV. As suggested by Proposition 3, self-deception causes an underestimation of the 
marginal HIV risk for individuals with a relatively low lifetime risk of acquiring HIV, and thus to 
lower than optimal investments in self-control in time period 2. This implies that sophisticated 
“low risk” individuals have incentives to engage in precautionary condom use in order to prevent 
excessive risk taking in the future. Naïveté of cognitive dissonance implies that this precautionary 
behavior does not take place, and thus to an increase in sexual risk taking in both time periods.  
In  contrast,  for  individuals  with  a  relatively  high  lifetime  risk  of  an  HIV  infection,  self-
deception implies an overestimation of the perceived marginal risk of an HIV infection in time 
period 2, and thus to overly restrictive behavior in this time period. Sophisticated “high risk” 
individuals thus have incentives to restrict consumption of unsafe sex in time period 1 in order to 




“low risk” individuals, naïveté of cognitive dissonance implies that “high risk” individuals will 
engage in excessive sexual risk taking in time period 1. However, for “high risk” individuals, the 
overconsumption of risky sex as young may actually contribute to a reduction in sexual risk taking 
in later time periods. The mechanism behind this result is that the increase in the subjective 
survival probability that arises due to an increase in sexual risk taking spurs investments in self-
control in later time periods among individuals characterized by a high risk of acquiring HIV. In 
other words, rationalization may prevent fatalism. However, excessive risk taking in period 1 will 
only contribute to a reduction in risk taking behavior in period 2 if the effect of rationalization on 
the  perceived  probability  of  being  HIV  negative  outweighs  the  reduction  in  true  survival 
probability due to lower condom use (i.e., if equation (24) is negative). 
4. Conclusion 
In many cases, decisions that seem defendable during states of strong affect are later found to 
collide with longer term interests and thus regretted. Regret, in turn, is commonly associated with 
negative emotions such as anxiety. The model, presented in this paper, focuses on our tendency 
to rationalize past behavior as a way to reduce anxiety and restore a consistent and positive self-
image. Admittedly, the consequences of affect induced myopia and cognitive dissonance may in 
many situations not lead to decisive life changes. However, in the case of sexual risk taking, 
decisions taken under affect may be irreversible. Hence, even if an individual changes behavior 
after realizing the  risk  taken, he or she cannot eliminate  the  risk  of being HIV positive. In 
addition, since HIV does not cause instant death, and since many individuals hesitate to test for 
HIV,  anxiety  may  occur  both  due  to  cognitive  dissonance  and  fear  of  social  stigma  and 
premature  death.  Since  past  behavior  cannot  be  made  undone  and  since  HIV  is  incurable, 
rationalizing may be one of few instruments left to reduce anxiety.  
The  results  presented  in  this  paper  suggest  that  sexual  risk  taking  may,  in  addition  to 
increasing the risk of an HIV infection directly, increase the inclination to engage in unsafe sex 
practices in the future and that the mechanism behind this behavior is two-fold: First, sexual risk 
taking during young age increases the likelihood of being infected with HIV and thus reduces the 
perceived marginal benefit of abstaining from unsafe sex during later periods in life. Second, if 
affect  induced  risk  taking  is  associated  with  defensive  denial  in  terms  of  rationalizing,  the 
underestimation  of  personal  per-coital  risk  of  HIV  may  lead  to  an  underestimation  of  the 
marginal cost of unprotected sex later in life and therefore to excessive risk taking behavior. 
However,  as  suggested  by  Proposition  3.2,  the  defense  mechanism  to  rationalize  may  not  be 
destructive in all circumstances. Since denial of risk also reduces the perceived probability of Risk and Rationalization – the role of affect... 
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being infected with HIV it may create incentives to use protection for individuals who would 
otherwise  resort  to  fatalism  and  reckless  behavior.  Hence,  self-deception  may  not  be  a 
maladaptive  coping  strategy  in  all  circumstances.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the  relatively 
substantial body of psychological research presented in van der Pligt et al. (1993) and van der 
Pligt (1996). 
Consistent with research in psychology, Proposition 4 suggests that anticipating regret (i.e. being 
aware of cognitive  dissonance  and rationalizing tendencies) increases incentives to engage in 
precautionary behavior, and that a spread between expected and actual emotions may contribute 
to maladaptive behavior (e.g. Richard et al., 1996;  Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). However, since 
the incentives schemes underlying the behavioral reactions to reductions in self-deception differ 
with regards to the true risk of being infected with HIV, empirical research is necessary in order 
to create policy recommendations. For individuals with a relatively low lifetime risk of HIV, a 
reduction in rationalization unambiguously increases incentives to abstain from unsafe sex in later 
time periods. However, for individuals with a substantial lifetime risk of HIV, rationalization 
reduces incentives to engage in unsafe sex via the effect on the perceived probability of being 
HIV  negative.  If  the  true  risk  of  HIV  is  sufficiently  high  and  if  some  risk  is  unavoidable, 
investments  in  self-control  may  be  perceived  as  relatively  fruitless.  This  implies  that  the 
mechanism underlying safe sex practices during young age is related to the incentive to prevent 
future selves from engaging in over-restrictive behavior.  
The  true  per-coital  transmission  rate  of  HIV  is  substantially  less  than  1  percent  for  the 
majority of the HIV susceptible population (e.g., Gray et al., 2001; Quinn, et al., 2000). However, 
as shown by Shaklee and Fishhoff (1990), many individuals overestimate the per-coital risk of an 
HIV infection.  The above analysis implies that if the  per-coital risk  of  HIV is perceived as 
relatively high, the knowledge that we will not be able to abstain completely from unsafe sex may 
induce fatalism. Hence, for individuals living in environments where HIV constitutes a significant 
threat it may actually prove beneficial to inform about the relatively low transmission probability 
of HIV in order to prevent excessive risk taking.    
It should be noted that these results are based on the assumption that individuals do not test 
for HIV. If people do take HIV tests from time to time, the analysis changes. Disregarding 
altruistic  motives,  HIV  positive  individuals  have  relatively  little  to  lose  from  indulging  in 
unprotected casual sex. However, for individuals testing negative, the marginal cost of unsafe sex 
will increase. 
Although  there  have  been  substantial  advances  within  the  economic  field  of  research 





40  For the subjects in these experiments, it may be easy to predict the experienced 
benefit of a positive outcome, or the experienced cost of a negative outcome. However, when it 
comes to issues of life and death, predicting experienced emotions may be more difficult. Hence, 
it is of immense importance to empirically investigate how decisions under risk are affected when 
the risk relates to issues such as HIV/AIDS.  In addition, and as mentioned above, the incentives 
for and consequences of different coping strategies such as defensive denial needs empirical 
investigation, not only in the realm of sexual risk taking behavior but also related to risk taking 
behavior in general. Finally, the model presented in this paper assumes that rational individuals 
base their decisions on relatively complicated probability calculations. Empirical research is 
needed to investigate if this assumption really holds.  
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Appendix 
A1. Variables, parameters and definitions 
Table A1.1   
Variables 
  Condom use in time period t 
  Self-control in time period t 
  Subjective per-coital risk of HIV 
Parameters 
  Objective per-coital risk of HIV 
  Exogenous supply of attractive sexual opportunities in time period t 
  Worry 
  Cognitive dissonance cost (fear) 
Superindex 
  Myopic optimum 
  First Best optimum 




Proof of proposition 1 
Compare the first order conditions for a far sighted and a short sighted individual. Equation (3) 




Myopic agents, on the other hand, maximize short term utility by setting: 
 
 




Substituting    from  equation  (A.2)  into  equation  (A.1)  gives  us  an  estimate  of  the  risk 
evaluation error that the sexually aroused self makes in t.1: 
    (A.3) 
Hence, if  , the value of using condoms is underestimated by the myopic 
agent in comparison to a rational individual without myopic tendencies and thus  . If if 
,  , q. e .d. 
 
Proof of proposition 2 











However, since  , and since  , the first order condition in equation (A.4) can 
never  be  fulfilled.  In  other  words,  we  have  a  corner  solution  where  the  forward  looking 








Note that, with the access to investments in self control,   is now given by: 
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Since  ,  it  follows  that  if  ,  .  Hence,  if 
, we can no longer rule out an interior solution for  . Let us further compare the first 
order condition for a sexually aroused self in time-period t.1 with and without the presence of 
self-control: 
     (A.9) 
 
     (A.10) 
Hence, if we have an interior solution, condom use will be higher when the LR1 has access to self 
controlling measures than when these measures are not available, q. e. d. 
Proof of proposition 3 
In order to see proposition 3, let us first analyze how the sign of    is affected by  
. In order to do this, let us define:  
     (A.11) 
         (A.12) 
where   pertains to the perceived marginal benefit of investments in self-control in terms of 
reduced HIV risk in the case of self-deception, and   is associated with the true marginal benefit 
in the absence of self-deception. Let us now add and subtract    and   from  in equation 
(28). By the first order condition for LR2 in equation (21) we can easily see that 





The term within square brackets in equation (A.13) corresponds to the difference in perceived 
marginal  cost  of  unsafe  sex  with  and  without  rationalization.   If 
, rationalization implies that the individual in t.2 underestimates the marginal cost 
of unsafe sex. This implies that the forward looking self in t.2 will under-invest in self-control 
from  the  perspective  of  the  forward  looking  self  in  t.1,  i.e.,  .  In  contrast,  if 




overestimates the marginal cost of unprotected sex, and thus that that the forward looking self in 
time period 2 overinvests in self-control from the perspective of the long run self in t.1, i.e., 
  
As  mentioned  above,  if  ,  then    and 
consequently  .  Rationalizing  behavior  by  assumption  implies  that  . 
However, as can be seen in figure A1 below, due to the non-linearity of the survival probability 
function, a higher perceived survival probability does not necessarily imply a reduction in the 
marginal cost of unprotected sex.  
 
Figure A1: Survival probability as a function of unprotected sex 
 
If we differentiate   with respect to   at a given level of 





Hence, if  , rationalization results in a lower perceived marginal cost of 
unprotected sex as compared to the case without rationalization and vice versa. The result in 
equation (A.14) suggests that effect of rationalization depends on the perceived probability of 
being  HIV  positive.  If  this  risk  is  sufficiently  large  (so  that  ),  then 
rationalization  may  increase  the  marginal  benefit  of  abstaining  from  unsafe  sex  due  to  the 
perceived increase in the likelihood of being HIV negative. 
Likewise,  taking  a closer  look  at      in  equation  (29),  we  see  that  the  sign  of  this 
expression hinges on the sign and relative magnitude of  . To see this, differentiate the 
first order condition for LR2 in equation (21) with respect to   and    and denote these 




us x  ~






If we have an interior solution, from the second order condition for a maximum it follows that 




Hence, the first term in equation (29) is unambiguously negative. The intuition behind this 
result is that, since increased condom use in period 1 reduces the likelihood of being infected by 
HIV, it raises the marginal benefit of investing in self control in time period 2. The second term 
within the square brackets relates to the partial derivative:   . From equation (18) it 









As can be seen in equation (A.18), the sign of   and thus of   hinge on whether 
 is greater or less than zero. Combining the result in equation (A.14) and (A.19) 
we thus have the following result: 
1.  If  ,then    and 
. Consequently,   and  . 
2.  If  , then   and   . 
Consequently,  . However, since   the sign of   depends 
on the relative magnitude of   and  .  
a.  If  , then   
b.  If  , then  <0, q.e.d. 
 




Proof of proposition 4 
In order to compare the behavior of a sophisticated individual to that of a naïve individual, let us 
differentiate equation (30‟) with respect to   and  and define these derivatives   and  , 









Now, given assumption 1,  , and from proposition 3 we know that 
. Hence,  , and we thus have that  , q. e. d. 
 